The senior leadership established two ground rules to govern what they hoped would be a lively debate: (1) any validated or revised concept must preserve the "special relationship" existing between the two services and; (2) the final concept must not diminish the utility of Naval Expeditionary Forces to the Joint Force Commander'.
In issuing such broad guidance, the CNO and CMC signaled their willingness to consider any approach -even the most unconventionalthat would resolve the serious inconsistencies seen to exist between current doctrine and future operating concepts. The fleet was given 12 months -from 1 April 2000 to 1 April 2001 -to challenge the assumptions that underpin current amphibious warfare doctrine. The effort produced few substantive changes. The Navy permitted the terms "supporting and supported" to be included in the newest version of joint amphibious doctrine in deference to the Marine Corps's position that this was a more accurate way to articulate command relationships within a deployed ARG/MEU. Otherwise, the new version is little more than a rehash of 60 year-old concepts. Long-standing philosophical differences were papered over instead of confronted and solved.
In many ways, the two services seem to be traveling down different Marine carrier-based aviation was as likely to be employed for fleet air defense as in support of landing force operations. Once ashore, the landing force remained tied to the Beach Support Area (BSA) and lacked the ability to move inland much beyond the Force Beachhead Line (FBHL).
Technology constraints in the area of field communications made it necessary for CATF to retain amphibious command and control of the forces until CLF could establish a physical presence ashore and assume tactical control of the operation.
The Slow Transition from Tactical to Operational Capability
The amphibious landing at Inchon demonstrated the utility of Marines and sailors -the largest grouping of Marine forces ever assembled for combat.
Of particular interest during DESERT STORM was the decision to keep two MEBs at sea under JFMCC control. These forces were used during deception operations to favorably influence the disposition of Iraqi forces defending Kuwait. CG I MEF's inability to assign tactical missions to these forces even while acting as the Marine service component clashed with the Corp's "single battle" concept and led many to conclude that existing amphibious doctrine had become absurd 2 . former Commandant of the Marine Corps, referred to these operations as the "3 block war"; a complex situation where Marines will be required to conduct concurrent missions ranging from humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and high intensity combat in the space of 3 city blocks 4 .
A Changing Strategic Environment

Post Cold War Navy/Marine Corps Operational Concepts
Today's US Navy was built to defeat the Soviet Red Banner Fleet.
When that threat disappeared in 1991, the Navy scrambled to redefine itself and collaborated with the Marine Corps to publish two brief operational concepts espousing the value of naval power in the littorals. "From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward...From the Sea" (1994) implied that the Navy and Marine Corps were literally "on the same page"
in identifying the littorals as the future operating environment for forward deployed Naval Expeditionary Forces.
The Marine Corps took its own littoral vision a step further with the release of "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS) in 1996.
OMFTS is defined as "the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bid for victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemy weakness in order to deal a decisive blow" 5 . Conceptually, it relies on an understanding of enemy and friendly centers of gravity (COG) in order to identify weak points for exploitation. Sea-based forces conduct over-the-horizon attacks in the flank and rear to unhinge the enemy and destroy his COG. The OMFTS concept was updated in time for last year's Quadrennial Defense Review as "Marine Corps Strategy 21" which extends the MAGTF's operational reach beyond the littorals to deep inland objectives (as in Afghanistan).
The "NEF" Debate
The term "Naval Expeditionary Force" (NEF) appeared in "From the Sea" as a generic reference to task organized Navy and Marine Corps forces employed for littoral operations6. Collaboration between deployed CVBGs and ARG/MEUs had become a common occurrence and led to the implementation of joint pre-deployment training to enhance interoperability and establish working relationships between commanders and staffs. The habitual partnership of these units led to the widespread use of the term "NEF" as nearly equivalent to the doctrinal terms "Task Force" or "Task Group". The term never received official sanction but continued to be used in the fleet as a shorthand way to refer to expeditionary force packages. It wasn't long before proposals for establishing a standing Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) appeared in print causing some consternation within the higher echelons of the naval services 7 . Finally, on October 1, 1997 the term NETF was officially disavowed in a joint CNO/CMC message that directed the fleet to drop the concept until further noticeB.
The most common explanation given for the NETF's demise was that no agreement could be reached as to who would command the organization9.
Once again, the discussion has gone full circle: times have changed; the threat has changed; we must change; how do we change? Why must the Navy always exercise command of Marines afloat? Are Marines trying to break away from the Navy? Does current amphibious doctrine support OMFTS?
Should the CVBG Commander always be in charge of a NETF? The same questions appear again and again but are never resolved. leaving it with C3F -a trainer. The CNEF concept has particular applicability in CENTCOM and PACOM given the important role accorded to amphibious and MPF forces for major regional conflicts in those AORs.
CNEF Planning functions
Upon receipt of the mission, CNEF conducts detailed mission analysis to identify operational objectives, assess threats and define Tour lengths for the Commander and senior staff should be a minimum of 24 months duration to provide continuity of command and facilitate plan development. The remaining billets could be filled with personnel serving tours lasting from between 6 and 24 months.
As previously noted, the biggest impediment to the NEF concept has been deciding who should be CNEF. typically ad hoc organizations that lack common procedures of any type, they exhibit a significant learning curve upon activation.
Conclusion
The current utility of Naval Expeditionary Forces in the war on terror provides the perfect opportunity for the senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps to take the next logical step towards achieving a unified operational concept for the Naval Service. Establishing a permanent CNEF CE -either from scratch or by assigning the mission to an existing operational USN/USMC HQ -will enhance the effectiveness of
